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I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1995, Tony, a senior at Seattle University, was
required to take a "ride-along" for his Police and Community class.
Tony chose to take his ride-along with the King County Police
Department.1
It was Saturday night, about 10:30 p.m. Tony and the police
officer were traveling down Pacific Highway South when they spotted
a dirty Dodge Dart with expired tabs. The officer turned on his
flashing lights, and pulled over the Dodge. The police officer shined
his vehicle spotlight on the car. Upon illumination, the officer realized
an older woman was driving. He said, under his breath, "Darn, it's a
chick." He went up to the car, told the woman to get current tabs,
and let her drive away.
What if the driver had not been a chick? What if the driver had
been a young, black male? At the time, Tony questioned the
significance of the officer's words. He was left with the feeling that,
if the officer had known the driver was an older woman, he would have
* B.A., Criminal Justice, Seattle University 1995; J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School
of Law, 1998. The author wishes to thank Professor Susan McClellan; Professor John LaFond;
Roxannna G. Fowler, D.C., C.S.S.T., for her input, patience, and advice; Paul Jon Ruuska, J.D.;
Judge Duncan Bonjorn; Marc A. Marquis; Kelly G. Blazy; Dominique L. Jinhong; and James E.
Marner, J.D. The author wishes to especially acknowledge and thank Julie Anne Tyrian for her
gentle prodding and support.
1. The following is a scenario that occurred between the author and a King County Police
officer during a ride-along in Federal Way, Washington.
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never stopped her. His comment, "Dam, it's a chick," made Tony
wonder if the police officer would only pull over a potential
score-something more exciting than the mundane, run of the mill,
expired tabs infraction.
As the above scenario illustrates, police officers have considerable
discretion over whom they will stop for a traffic violation. In June
1996, the United States Supreme Court, in Whren v. United States,
handed down a ruling that could allow police to exercise nearly
limitless discretion.2 The Whren decision effectively overruled the
pretext stop doctrine under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.3
Under the Whren holding, the constitutional standard for a police
traffic stop is whether the officer "could have" made the stop, based
only on whether the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic
infraction occurred.4
Consider the introductory scenario and substitute a young, long-
haired, white male for the older woman. Suppose the officer was a
plainclothes narcotics officer, who saw this young male driving his
Dodge Dart with expired tabs. Suppose also that this youth fit the
King County police department's "drug-image" profile. If the
narcotics officer pulled him over, looking for drugs under the guise of
expired tabs, would it have been a legal stop? If the narcotics officer
found drugs, would they have been admissible at trial?
Under the Whren decision, this stop would have been constitu-
tional, because the officer had some form of probable cause: the youth
was driving with expired tabs.' It would not have mattered that the
narcotics officer was not a traffic officer, that is, one who normally
enforces traffic infractions. It would not have mattered if the narcotics
officer had not even seen the expired tabs. It would not have mattered
that a traffic officer in a similar situation would normally not have
stopped an individual for that minor violation. As long as the
narcotics officer could point to probable cause of any kind, the stop
would be constitutional under the Whren decision.6
In Washington state, however, such a "pretext" stop would not
be permissible. Washington courts consider this stop a "pretext"
because a reasonable plainclothes narcotics officer would not normally
2. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (holding that the "could have"
standard applies to determine whether a stop is pretextual under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution).
3. Id.





concern him or herself with ordinary traffic stops.' Washington
courts use the "would have" standard to determine whether a stop is
pretextual.8 Under this standard, the courts first determine whether
the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction
occurred, and second, whether a reasonable officer, acting under the
same circumstances, "would have" made the stop. 9  Because a
reasonable narcotics officer would probably not make an ordinary
traffic stop, pulling the youth over because he was driving with expired
tabs would probably be a pretext stop. Such a stop would not be
permissible under Washington law.1"
This Note argues that the "could have" standard makes a mockery
of the probable cause protections provided by the Fourth Amendment
and that the Washington courts should not adopt that standard.
Instead, because Washington courts have traditionally held that Article
1, Section 7, of the Washington Constitution provides broader
protection than the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
the Washington courts should continue to use the "would have"
standard to determine whether a stop is pretextual under Article 1,
Section 7.11
Part II of this Note briefly describes the applicable search and
seizure doctrine and tracks the split in the federal circuits regarding
which standard is appropriate for the courts to apply in determining
whether a pretext stop has occurred. Specifically, this section will
7. See State v. Chapin, 75 Wash. App. 460, 468, 879 P.2d 300, 305 (1994) (holding that
a pretext stop is governed by the "would have" standard: whether a reasonable officer "would





11. 1 have limited the scope of this Note to the pretext stop doctrine as it applies to traffic
stops. This Note considers the Whren decision and whether an independent state constitutional
analysis indicates that Article 1, Section 7, of the Washington State Constitution provides broader
protection than the Fourth Amendment. For extensive history and background on pretext stops,
see generally John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 523 (1984); Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The
Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext
Doctrine, 79 KY. L.J. 1 (1990); Laurie A. Buckenberger, Note, Criminal Procedure: Pretextual
Arrests: In United States v. Scopo the Second Circuit Raises the Price of a Traffic Ticket
(Considerably), 61 BROOK L. REV. 453 (1995); Scott Campbell, Comment, United States v.
Ferguson: The Sixth Circuit Adds a Third Test for Pretextual Police Conduct, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
277 (1995); Matthew S. Crider, Note, Criminal Procedure - Searches and Seizures - Police Officers
Must Meet "Reasonable Qfficer" Standard to Withstand Pretext Claim, State v. Haskell, 645 A.2d
619 (Me. 1994), 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 629 (1995).
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compare the strengths and flaws of three standards: (1) the subjective,
(2) the "could have," and (3) the "would have."
Part III of this Note introduces the Whren case and analyzes the
unanimous opinion, authored by Justice Scalia. This section contrasts
Justice Scalia's reasoning and conclusions with those of Washington
State courts and various commentators.
Part IV shifts focus and undertakes an independent state
constitutional analysis by applying the six nonexclusive Gunwall
factors.12 Application of the Gunwall factors indicates whether the
Washington State Constitution provides broader protection than does
the Fourth Amendment. Next, this section analyzes the facts of
Whren under Washington State law to determine whether Washington
courts would have decided Whren differently under Article 1, Section
7, of the State Constitution.
This Note concludes that, while the Whren decision textually
meets the Fourth Amendment requirements, it tramples on the spirit
of the U.S. Constitution in two ways. First, the Whren decision makes
a mockery of the probable cause protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Second, it effectively discards any meaningful pretext stop
doctrine, thus giving police officers nearly unbridled discretion to
conduct pretext stops. As such, Washington courts should enforce a
pretext doctrine with bite by continuing to apply the "would have"
standard.
II. SEARCH & SEIZURE PRINCIPLES
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has two equally
important parts. The first part of the amendment protects people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, while the second part establishes
the probable cause requirement for the issuance of warrants.13 Fourth
Amendment protections are triggered only when police action rises to
12. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (1986).
13. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an interesting and succinct history of the Fourth Amendment and
search and seizure generally, see Alexander E. Eisemann, Note, Addressing the Pretext Problem:
The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amendment Violations, 63 B. U. L.
REV. 223, 226 (1983). See also, Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
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the level of a search or seizure and when the police conduct is
unreasonable. 4 To determine whether police conduct has violated the
Fourth Amendment, the courts apply an objective test that considers
the officer's conduct under the totality of the circumstances. 5 This
objective standard is a balancing test that requires the court to weigh
the level of intrusion into a person's privacy against the "promotion of
legitimate governmental interests."16
The second part of the Fourth Amendment identifies the probable
cause requirement. 7 Generally, the police are required to have a
warrant based upon probable cause to arrest someone or to search their
person, home, or belongings." Probable cause to arrest requires that
the totality of circumstances apparent to the police officer must be such
that a reasonable person could conclude that the particular individual
has committed a crime. 9 Probable cause to search also contains a
temporal limitation and requires that the items sought are reasonably
likely to be found at the place to be searched.20 Many arrests and
searches, however, are conducted without a warrant, since there are
numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement. 2' But, even without
a warrant, the officer must have probable cause to conduct the search
or to make the arrest.2 In most cases, it is the officer who makes the
initial determination that probable cause exists, but subject to review
by a magistrate at a later time.23
An officer's actions may amount to something less than a full-
blown search or arrest.24 Stop-and-frisk actions are less intrusive to
a person than a full-blown search or arrest.25 Therefore, an officer
need not have probable cause to conduct a stop-and-frisk. The officer
must, however, be able to point to specific and articulable facts, based
14. See, e.g., State v. Thorn, 129 Wash. 2d 347, 350, 917 P.2d 108, 111 (1996) (stating
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search or seizure).
15. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985).
16. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (holding, inter alia, that
probable cause is necessary in order to arrest with or without a warrant).
19. See id.
20. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
21. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (listing and
describing some of the numerous exceptions). The numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirement are beyond the scope of this Note.
22. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421 (1976).
23. Id. at 423.
24. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. See id. at 16-20.
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on the totality of the circumstances, that indicate the person is
committing a crime.26
When a police officer stops and detains an individual for a traffic
violation, it is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment 7.2  Although
the detention may be brief, and the purpose of the stop narrowly
focused, the officer must at least have specific and articulable facts that
support the stop.2 The police officer will normally have more than
an articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction has occurred because
the police officer usually has seen the infraction, which amounts to
probable cause for the stop. Ironically, it is the probable cause that
provides the mechanism that gives rise to the whole doctrine of pretext
stops, because lawful pretext stops are based on probable cause.
A. Pretext Stops
There are two types of pretext stops-lawful pretext stops based
on probable cause and fabricated pretext stops which are not based on
probable cause. 29 A lawful pretext stop occurs when the police officer
has probable cause for a minor offense. The officer may stop a person
based on the minor offense to inquire or investigate a major offense for
which there is no probable cause."0 Thus, if an officer possesses
probable cause that a traffic infraction has occurred, the officer has
legal justification to issue a citation, to arrest, or to search-no matter
how minor the traffic infraction is.31
A good example of a "lawful" pretext stop is the introductory
scenario. Upon noticing expired tabs, the officer pulls over the driver.
The officer may have a hunch, but no articulable suspicion or probable
cause that the driver has drugs on his person or in his car, but the
officer can use the expired tabs as a pretext to try to discover if in fact
there are drugs. Before the Whren decision, a lawful pretext stop of
26. See id. at 20-27.
27. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653.
28. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (holding that in order to stop and frisk a person, the police
officer need not have probable cause, but must articulate more than a hunch, i.e., "articulable
suspicion").
29. See Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use,
Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rule and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MicH. L.
REV. 442, 502 (1990); Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle, supra note 11.
30. See U.S. v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) (after discussing the various
tests used to determine whether a stop is a pretext, the Guzman court held that the "would have
standard" is the "better test").
31. See, e.g., State v. Chapin, 75 Wash. App. 460, 465 n.9, 879 P.2d 300, 303 n.9 (1994)
(acknowledging that in Washington State the normal practice following a minor traffic infraction
is for the police to issue a citation; therefore, it is generally inappropriate for a police officer to
arrest a driver following a traffic infraction). See also WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.015 (1996).
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this nature would be impermissible in Washington state." Under
Whren, however, this stop would be allowed because the officer had
probable cause-the driver's expired tabs.33
The second type of pretext stop occurs when the police officer
falsifies or fabricates probable cause.34 This is known as a "fabricat-
ed" pretext stop.3 S This type of pretext stop is clearly unconstitution-
al, because the officer does not have any basis for the stop except for
a hunch that the driver is engaged in some type of illegal activity.36
An example of a fabricated pretext stop was presented in a recent
exposE on the Dateline NBC television news program.37 The expos6
focused on the disturbing practice of Louisiana police officers who
fabricate minor traffic infractions to pull over drivers with out-of-state
license plates who fit a drug-courier profile.3 1 The officers drive
behind an out-of-state car, follow them for a distance, and pull them
over for a purported minor infraction such as weaving or speeding up
and slowing down.39 Because of the fabricated probable cause, the
officers assert lawful justification to search and seize the vehicle and
the contents of the vehicle, arrest the driver, or detain them in jail.40
In some cases, drivers who cannot hire a lawyer have actually lost their
vehicles."
To expose the Louisiana police practices, the producers hid five
cameras inside a car with out-of-state plates, in order to show the
vehicle from all angles, and then set the cruise control at a few miles
under the speed limit.42 Soon, a Louisiana police officer pulled
behind the car, followed it for several miles, and finally stopped it for"speeding up and slowing down" repeatedly.43 The hidden cameras
inside the vehicle revealed that the speed of the car had not varied.
The officer approached the vehicle, ordered the driver and passenger
32. See Chapin, 75 Wash. App. at 468, 879 P.2d at 305.
33. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.
34. See generally Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle, supra note 11.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. The Dateline NBC transcript, January 3, 1997, is on file at the Seattle University Law
Review.
38. See id. at 3.
39. See id. at 5-6.
40. See id. at 4.
41. See id. at 12. The expos( also unearthed the egregious fact that the particular police
departments received a cut from the proceeds of their seizures, money that the officers used for
ski trips to Colorado, clothing, meals, and other trivialities. See id. at 14-15.
42. See id. at 5.
43. See id. at 6.
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out of the car, and questioned them before allowing them to leave.44
The expose revealed the inherent problem in either lawful or fabricated
pretext stops: "The true evil of the pretext case is the virtually
unlimited authority of the police officer to arrest and search based on
minor offenses. 45
To determine if a pretext stop has occurred, the courts have
applied three standards: (1) subjective, (2) "could have," or (3) "would
have." Whether legal or fabricated pretext, the underlying issue of
which standard to apply centers on how much authority a police officer
should have. The issue and debate over which of the standards best
establishes pretext has been hotly debated for some time by judges and
commentators and among the federal circuits.46
B. The Subjective Standard
The subjective standard focuses on the primary purpose of the
arresting officer in making the stop. 47 This focus requires the courts
to determine the police officer's motivation in making the stop."' If
the court finds that the motivation was improper, then the stop is
unconstitutional and the evidence inadmissible.49
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit rejected the subjective standard. 0
The court stated that a subjective standard is ineffective, emphasizing
the futility of inquiring into an officer's subjective state of mind.51
Thus, the subjective standard was put to rest, with no federal circuits
now using it to determine whether a stop is a pretext.5 2 With the
demise of the subjective standard, the circuits have split over two
variations of an objective standard: the "could have" and the "would
have" standard.
44. See id.
45. Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle, supra note 11, at 59.
46. See generally id. at 2-28.
47. See U.S. v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1986) (referring to the police officer's
probable cause, and that the search of the defendant was incident to a lawful arrest, not an
improper motivation---ergo, no pretext).
48. Id. at 1124.
49. See id.
50. See U.S. v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475-476 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the previous
holdings of the Ninth Circuit are consistent with the "would have" standard used by the Tenth
and Eleventh Circuits).




C. The "Could Have" Standard
The "could have" standard is also known as the "pure objective"
test.53 The court's focus under this standard is whether the arresting
officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a
traffic offense and whether the local law authorizes a stop for such an
offense.54 The key under the "could have" standard is probable
cause.5" If the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime is or
is likely to be committed, he or she absolutely "could have" made the
stop.56 Thus, no pretext exists.
A good example of the courts' regard for the "could have"
standard is U.S. v. Causey.57 In Causey, the Fifth Circuit abandoned
the subjective standard, holding that "so long as police do no more
than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their
motives in doing so are irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry. '"58
In Causey, Louisiana police officers received an anonymous tip
that the defendant had robbed a bank in Baton Rouge.59 The police
discovered an old warrant on a petty theft charge, arrested the
defendant, interrogated him, called the FBI, and eventually obtained
a voluntary confession for the Baton Rouge bank robbery.60
During the pre-trial motions, one police officer testified that the
only reason for arresting the defendant on the old warrant was to
investigate the robbery.61 Nonetheless, the court found that, because
the officers had a valid warrant, they "took no action that they were
not legally authorized to take," and nothing "improper occur[ed]. ' 62
Probable cause had allowed a magistrate to issue the old warrant.63
Because of that warrant, the officer technically "could have" made the
arrest.64  Therefore, there was no pretext. As the Causey court
demonstrates, under the "could have" standard, the officer's improper
motives are immaterial. 65
53. See State v. Chapin, 75 Wash. App. 460, 466, 879 P.2d 300, 304 (1994).
54. See U.S. v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989).
55. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
56. See id.
57. U.S. v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987).
58. See id. at 1184.
59. See id. at 1180.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 1180-81.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. See Causey, 834 F.2d at 1181.
65. See id. at 1183.
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The most cogent argument for following the "could have"
standard is that it fits within the textual guidelines of the Fourth
Amendment.66 The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant based on
probable cause.67 If an officer has probable cause and can point to
facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe
that a particular individual has committed a crime, the Fourth
Amendment requirement has been satisfied.6"
However, the "could have" standard illustrates the paper-thin
shield that the Fourth Amendment places between citizens and police
officers. If the police have probable cause, then the probable cause
itself acts as a gate to close off the other protections of the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment shield is paper-thin because
probable cause exists to guarantee that citizens have sufficient
protection against unfettered police discretion.6 9 Thus, when the
police have probable cause, textually the Fourth Amendment's
purposes have been served.
However, under the "could have" standard, probable cause plays
a very different role: it no longer acts as a protection against unfettered
police discretion; instead, it acts as a vehicle for unfettered police
discretion, while simultaneously shutting off access to other Fourth
Amendment protections. If an officer can point to probable cause of
any type, in either a lawful or fabricated pretext stop, the purpose and
protection of the Fourth Amendment are shut off. Thus, the "could
have" standard's reliance on probable cause is artificial at best.70
Kamisar, LaFave, and Israel have noted that since the advent of
the "war against drugs," state troopers are always conscious of
suspicious-looking travelers on the interstate highways." In a case
they cited in support of this statement, a state trooper noticed a van
with black occupants inside. The trooper drove passed the van, came
to the top of a hill, pulled to the shoulder, and turned off his head-
lights. The van crested the hill, the driver noticed the car on the
shoulder, and changed lanes. The trooper pulled over the van for an
illegal lane change, and the court upheld the charge.72 The authors
concluded that "illustrations from the many reported cases [of minor
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
67. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
68. See id.
69. See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (Fourth Amendment protects by not
allowing complete police discretion).
70. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 24 (Supp. 1996).
71. See id.
72. See United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1089 (5th Cir. 1993), cited in id.
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traffic infractions] reveal how little it takes to supply grounds for a
traffic stop [that are] acceptable to the courts."73
This example pinpoints the overriding problem with the "could
have" standard. From a textualist view, there can be no "fabricated"
pretext stop because the officers can always fulfill the textual probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment.74  However, from an
originalist view, the framers of the Bill of Rights, who were generally
distrustful of unchecked government power,7" in all likelihood did not
envision the probable cause requirement as a double-edged sword,
where one edge provides the means for a pretext stop, while the other
edge sharply cuts off access to the very protection originally contem-
plated by the probable cause requirement. The "could have" standard
thus tramples on the spirit of the Fourth Amendment because the
framers certainly envisioned the probable cause requirement as a check
on police discretion, and not as a vehicle for the exercise of unbridled
police discretion.76
D. The "Would Have" Standard
The courts that do not follow the "could have" standard follow
another version of an objective test-the "would have" standard. The"would have" standard focuses on whether an officer has the requisite
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the stop and whether
the officer was conforming with regular police procedures when making
the stop.77 This differs from the "could have" standard, because
under the "could have" standard, the existence of probable cause ends
the inquiry.78
The Ninth Circuit adopted the "would have" standard in U.S. v.
Cannon.7 9 In Cannon, the police officers had a search warrant for a
defendant who could only be served during daytime hours. 80 The
police learned through an informant where the defendant's car was
parked.81 Since the police officers knew the defendant did not have a
valid driver's license, they had a uniformed police officer determine
73. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 70, at 25.
74. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
75. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 51 (James Madison), NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
76. See LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations, supra note 29.
77. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988).
78. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
79. 29 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 1994).
80. See id. at 474.
81. Seeid. at 473
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when the defendant was driving the car and then stop the defendant
for a suspended license.12
The uniformed officer stopped the defendant, received permission
to search the car, found $16,000 in the trunk, and radioed for the other
officers who were nearby.8 3 Upon arrival at the scene, those officers
found cocaine residue and arrested the defendant. 4 Because of the
evidence found through the suspended license infraction, the officers
received authorization to execute the search warrant during the
nighttime hours," and found further incriminating evidence. 6
During trial, the defendant argued that the proper standard to
determine whether a stop was pretextual was the subjective stan-
dard. 7 The Ninth Circuit, finding the subjective standard "ineffec-
tive," held that its previous decisions were consistent with the "would
have" standard. 8 By adopting this standard, the Ninth Circuit
aligned itself with the Tenth and Eleventh circuits in framing the
inquiry as "whether a reasonable police officer would have stopped the
defendant for the traffic violation, absent his unrelated suspicions.
"89
Thus, although all of the circuits have affirmatively rejected the
subjective standard, there remains a split in the circuits on which
objective standard is more appropriate.9 While many circuits follow
the "could have" standard, other circuits properly require more than
mere technical, textual compliance with the Fourth Amendment
mandate for probable cause. These circuits require not only probable





87. See id. at 475.
88. See id. at 476.
89. Id.
90. The 8-3 split among the circuits:
Those following the "could have" standard: Second Circuit (United States v. Scopo, 19
F.3d 777 (2nd Cir. 1994)); Third Circuit (United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210 (3rd
Cir. 1987)); Fourth Circuit (United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993));
Fifth Circuit (United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987)); Sixth Circuit
(United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 1993)); Seventh Circuit (United States
v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989)); Eighth Circuit (United States v. Cummins,
920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990)); and D.C. Circuit (United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371
(D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)).
Those following the "would have" standard: Ninth Circuit (United States v.
Cannon, 29 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 1994)); Tenth Circuit (U.S. v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512
(10th Cir. 1988)); and Eleventh Circuit (U.S. v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986)).
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cause but also satisfaction of the reasonable officer test, the "would
have" standard.9'
Although the "would have" standard complies with the spirit of
the Fourth Amendment, it is also problematic. The "would have"
standard requires probable cause, but it goes one step further, asking
whether a reasonable police officer "would have" made the stop.92
Arguably, this double inquiry goes beyond the minimal Fourth
Amendment requirement of probable cause, and thus affords more
protection than required by the Fourth Amendment.93
Also, because additional focus is placed on the reasonable police
officer complying with regular police procedures, a second flaw is
evident: acting reasonably is defined as compliance with regular police
procedures. Because regular police procedures vary widely among
jurisdictions, the reasonable police officer in Denver or Washington,
D.C. may not be the reasonable police officer in Seattle, Memphis, or
Miami. Thus, to determine what a reasonable officer "would have"
done necessitates either a national uniformity in police procedures, or
that the reasonable officer will vary from state to state.94 This is why
it is important to conduct an independent state constitutional analysis
in the area of pretext stops. The privacy expectations of Washington
citizens and the practices of Washington police officers are different
from the privacy expectations and police practices of other states.95
While the "would have" standard is problematic, it provides for
a pretext doctrine with a bite. The "could have" standard effectively
eliminates any need for pretext analysis. Now, under Whren, there no
longer exists a "legal" pretext doctrine in federal courts.96 Conse-
quently, the only relief from pretext stops for the citizens of Washing-
ton state rests with state courts under the State Constitution, under
which the citizens of Washington state have broader protection than
provided under the Fourth Amendment and the Whren decision.
91. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
subjective intent of the officer in making a traffic stop is immaterial, and that the "could have"
standard is not determinative; the "better test" is the "would have" standard).
92. See State v. Chapin, 75 Wash. App. 460, 468, 879 P.2d 300, 305 (1996).
93. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
94. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.
95. See id.
96. 116 S. Ct. 1769.
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III. THE WHREN CASE
A. The Facts
On June 13, 1993, two young black males, in a dark Nissan
Pathfinder with temporary license tags, stopped at a stop sign.
Plainclothes officers of the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police
Department, patrolling a "high drug area" in an unmarked car with the
intent of finding narcotics activity,97 passed the Pathfinder, saw the
defendants inside, and noticed that the driver was looking down into
the lap of the front seat passenger.9" One officer later stated that the
driver was "not paying full time and attention to his driving,"99 and
that the Pathfinder remained stopped at the stop sign for "what seemed
to be an unusually long period of time-more than 20 seconds."100 '
Although the Pathfinder was stopped for more than 20 seconds, the
officer testified that the vehicle behind the Pathfinder did not honk or"otherwise request the Pathfinder to move."'10 1 When the officers
turned around to "'investigate'-to inquire of the driver 'why did he
stay at the stop sign for so long length [sic] of a time, '' 102 the
Pathfinder turned right without signaling, and "spe[d] off quickly
towards Minnesota Avenue." ' 3 The officers followed the Pathfinder
until it stopped at a red light, °4 where the officers blocked it with
their vehicle."0 ' As Officer Soto approached the Pathfinder, he
observed what appeared to be two large bags of crack cocaine in the
passenger's hands." 6 The passenger of the Pathfinder was Michael
97. See U.S. v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
98. See id. at 373.
99. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5891). For U.S.
Supreme Court briefs, see: 1996 WL 75758 (Pet. Brief); 1996 WL 115816 (Resp. Brief); 1996
WL 164375 (Reply Brief).
100. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Whren (No. 95-5891).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 5-6. When asked if the driver signaled, Officer Littlejohn stated, "it used no
hand or mechanical turn signals at all that I can remember." When asked if the Pathfinder was
conforming with the speed limit in that area, Officer Littlejohn testified, "it was my opinion that
it was unreasonable speed."
104. See id. at 7.
105. Id. at 8.
106. See id. At the suppression hearing, there was conflicting testimony from Officer
Littlejohn and Officer Soto regarding the number of bags that defendant Whren was holding.
Officer Littlejohn testified that the defendant was "holding only one bag of cocaine, which he was
displaying to Brown with his right hand while his left hand rested on his lap." Officer Soto
testified that the defendant was holding a plastic bag of cocaine in each hand. Officer Littlejohn
testified that both he and Officer Soto were standing in positions such that they enjoyed the same
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Whren. He and the driver, James Brown, were arrested. The search
of the vehicle netted illegal drugs." 7 Michael Whren and James
Brown were indicted on charged four counts, which included federal
offenses.108
B. The District Court
Both Whren and Brown moved, in a pretrial hearing, to suppress
the evidence found in the Pathfinder, because it was the result of an
illegal pretext search.1" At the pretrial hearing, Officer Soto testified
that his intent in approaching the Pathfinder was two-fold: he wanted
to ask why Brown had stopped so long at the stop sign, and why
Brown was speeding."0 The officer also stated that he did not
intend to issue Brown a ticket."' However, the defendants argued
that the plainclothes officers did not have probable cause to believe
that drug-type activities were going on, nor did they have reasonable
suspicion of drug activity."' Therefore, Officer Soto's approaching
the Pathfinder to give a warning was a mere pretext, in order "to find
narcotics activity going on." '13 The defendants argued that since the
vantage point from which to see the defendant.
107. See id. at 9. The search netted a bag of cocaine base, a loose rock of cocaine base that
Whren tried to hide in a secret compartment in the passenger door, and two tin foils of marijuana
laced with PCP.
108. See WMren, 53 F.3d at 372. A federal grand jury returned a four count indictment.
It charged the defendants with the following: Count 1, Possession with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of cocaine base, or crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1) and 841
(b)(1)(a)(iii); Count 2, Possession with intent to distribute cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a
school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860 (a); Count 3, Possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (a); Count 4, Possession of a controlled substance
(PCP) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844 (a).
109. See Whren, 53 F.3d at 372.
110. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 5.
111. See id. at 7.
Officer Soto explained, "the only circumstances that I would issue tickets-I'm a vice
investigator; I'm not out there to give tickets-is for just reckless, reckless driving,
something that in my personal view would somehow endanger the safety of anybody
who's walking around the street or even the occupants of a vehicle, maybe children or
whoever... I wasn't going to issue a ticket to him at all. That was not my intention
at all. My intention was to pull him over and talk to him." Officer Soto also
acknowledged that his job duties as a vice officer is "out there almost strictly to do drug
investigations." In fact, he testified that he pulls people over for traffic infractions "not
very often at all."
This statement by Officer Soto indicates that he was not complying with his regular police
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stop was a pretext, it was unconstitutional, and the court should
suppress the evidence.114
The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress,
"concluding that 'the facts of the stop were not controverted,' and
'[t]here was nothing to really demonstrate that the actions of the
officers were contrary to a normal traffic stop.""'1.I  The defendants
were found guilty of all four counts." 6  Michael Whren was sen-
tenced to 168 months in prison, a term of supervised release, and a fine
of $8,800."' James Brown was sentenced to 168 months in prison
and a term of supervised release."'
C. The Court of Appeals
On appeal, the defendants argued that the "would have" standard
was superior to the "could have" standard because the "would have"
standard reveals the police practice of pulling people over for violations
that "reasonable officers would generally ignore.""' 9 However, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the subjective
intent of a police officer is immaterial. So long as the occupants of the
automobile were acting in a manner that a reasonable officer "could
have" made the stop, the stop is constitutional. 20
In so holding, the court adopted the "could have" standard,
stating two justifications. First, the "could have" standard eliminates
the need for courts to "inquire into an officer's subjective state of
mind."' 2' As such, the standard properly aligns itself with the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of an "objective assessment of the
officers' actions[.]"' 122  Second, the "could have" standard guards
114. Whren, 53 F.3d at 372.
115. Id. at 373.
116. See id.
117. See id. The Court sentenced Whren to the following on January 26, 1994: Count 1:
168 months incarceration and five years supervised release. Count 2: 168 months incarceration
and ten years supervised release. Counts 3 & 4: one year incarceration and one year supervised
release. All sentences were to be served concurrently. Whren was assessed the following fies:
$8,800 on each count, all frnes to be concurrent with count two, and a special assessment of $150.
Brown was sentenced to the following on February 9, 1994: Count 1: 168 months
incarceration and ten years supervised release. Count 2: 168 months incarceration and five years
supervised release. Counts 3 & 4: one year imprisonment and one year supervised release. All
sentences were to be served concurrently. Brown was assessed the following fine: $150 special
assessment.
118. See id.
119. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 99, at 11.





against police abuse of power because it requires the police officer to
have probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the traffic infraction
occurred.123
The D.C. Circuit's decision is significant because it adopted the
same standard for determining pretext stops used by a majority of the
other circuits. In 1995, after it joined the majority, the number of
circuits using the "could have" standard was eight, those- using the"would have" test was three.'24
D. The Supreme Court
Following the D.C. Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Michael Whren and James Brown. 2 ' In a unanimous
opinion, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict among the circuit
courts by holding that the "could have" standard is the proper
standard to determine whether a stop is a pretext. 126 Justice Scalia
authored the opinion, stating that the "would have" standard is
"plainly and indisputably driven by subjective considerations. '"127
Therefore, because Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is based on
objective assessments and standards, the "would have" standard is
inappropriate.
In so holding, Justice Scalia made six points. First, under the
Fourth Amendment, the police "decision to stop an automobile is
reasonable so long as they have probable cause to believe that an
infraction has occurred. "128 Recall that to determine whether a police
action amounting to a search or seizure is reasonable, the court
balances the level of intrusion into a person's right to privacy against
the government's interests. 29 However, when an officer has probable
cause to believe that a crime or traffic infraction has occurred, the
probable cause itself satisfies the balancing test, except in extraordinary
circumstances. 3 0  The existence of probable cause automatically
123. See id. at 376. "[T]he 'could have' test provides a principled limitation on abuse of
power. Officers cannot make a traffic stop unless they have probable cause to believe a traffic
violation has occurred or a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct based upon articulable
facts-requirements which restrain police behavior."
124. See supra note 90.
125. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 1774.
128. Id. at 1772.
129. See Macon, 472 U.S. at 468-469; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-654.
130. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769.
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equals reasonableness.131 If a search or seizure is reasonable, it does
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 32
Second, the constitutionality of a traffic stop does not turn on the
subjective intent of the police officer. 3   Third, the "would have"
test is actually a subjective test, cloaked in objective terms."3 Justice
Scalia points out that although the second prong of the "would have"
standard is based on a "reasonable police officer," it still requires an
assessment of his subjective intent.'35
Fourth, although the Fourth Amendment actually requires a
"balancing of all relevant factors," this case does not require a
balancing test, because even if the officers deviated from normal
procedures they had probable cause to believe the defendants com-
mitted a traffic infraction."' Because the officers had probable cause
to stop the defendants, the probable cause outweighs the defendant's
privacy interests in avoiding police contact. 37
Fifth, the "would have" standard would force courts to exercise"virtual subjectivity"-"speculating about the hypothetical reaction of
131. See id. at 1777.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1774. "Subjective intent alone.., does not make otherwise lawful conduct
illegal or unconstitutional." Justice Scalia referred to several cases to support this point: "Not
only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection...
that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment;
but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary." Id. Justice Scalia points specifically to
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983). In note 3, the court "flatly dismissed
the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip the agents of their legal justification." Justice
Scalia also referenced United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) where they held that "a
traffic-violation arrest (of the sort here) would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was 'a
mere pretext for a narcotics search[.]'"
134. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774. The defendants "insist that the standard they have put
forward-whether the officer's conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a
reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons
given-is an 'objective' one. But although framed in empirical terms, this approach is plainly and
indisputable driven by subjective considerations." Id. Justice Scalia apparently sees the "would
have" test as subjective because the standard still asks a subjective question: "whether (based on
general police practices) it is plausible to believe that the officer had the proper state of mind."
Id.
135. See id. at 1774-75.
136. See id. at 1775.
137. See id. at 1776. Basically, Justice Scalia states that where you have probable cause, you
do not need to balance. There are rare exceptions to this rule: if the police action is conducted
in an "extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy." Id. The court uses
the example of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where a young black male was shot in the
back by a police officer as the boy was trying to scale a fence. A woman had reported a prowler
in her home. The responding police searching around the back side of the house, saw the
defendant run across the yard. The officer, although he testified that he did not believe the
defendant was armed, shot the defendant pursuant to Tennessee's "Fleeing Felony Statute." See
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982).
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a hypothetical constable."' 38 Essentially, Justice Scalia is referring to
the flaw inherent in the "would have" standard: what is the standard
to determine what actions a "reasonable" police officer would take.'39
The sixth point effectively lays the "would have" standard to rest
by invalidating the second prong of the standard. Justice Scalia
concludes that, "it is a leap from the proposition that following regular
procedures is some evidence of lack of pretext to the proposition that
failure to follow regular procedures proves . . . pretext."'' 40 Because
the "would have" standard fails, Justice Scalia considers the "could
have" standard as the obvious choice because it complies with the
textual requirement of the Fourth Amendment by asking the magic
question: did the officers have any probable cause sufficient to justify
the stop? 4'
Justice Scalia appears to be mostly concerned with the subjective
flavor of the "would have" standard and the fact that courts would
have to engage in an exercise known as "virtual subjectivity."'42
However, this "virtual subjectivity" reasoning has no force. 43 Under
the "would have" standard the court is required only to make the
initial determination of probable cause with reference to the police
procedure manual.' If the police officer is complying with standard
operating procedures, and has probable cause, there is no pretext. 45
This type of inquiry is hardly the horrible game of speculating about
the hypothetical constable that Justice Scalia posits. In fact, requiring
compliance with police practices will allow clever policy makers, who
138. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775.
139. See id.
140. Id. The court, in so stating, referenced the fact that police practices would be too
tenuous for any trial court judge to "practicably assess" and that police practices differ or "vary
from place to place and from time to time." Id. As such, it would not be practicable for a
standard to turn on whether a police officer varied from standard procedures. Although beyond
the scope of this paper, it is interesting to note that following "regular practices" are relied upon
by the courts in many different contexts. For example, in the Administrative Law context, it has
been held that before an agency can terminate a potential beneficiary's entitlement, the agency
must comply with its own internal procedures. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). Arguably,
there exist many other areas of law that require strict compliance with regular procedures. In the
context of criminal law, where the stakes for the accused are so high, it would not impose too
great of a hardship for police to follow standard operation procedures.
141. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775-1776. "For the run-of-the-mine case, which this surely
is, we think there is no realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that probable cause
justifies a search and seizure." Id. at 1777.
142. See id. at 1776.
143. See LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations, supra note 29.
144. See Chapin, 75 Wash. App. at 468, 879 P.2d at 305.
145. See id.
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draft the police regulations, to write regulations that will allow all
police officers to make minor traffic stops.146
This problem has been addressed by Professor LaFave, who has
long supported a pretext doctrine that comports with the "would have"
standard.147 Professor LaFave notes that unchecked police discretion
is a major concern throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 4 '
He contends that explicit, written, police policies and procedures are
essential in the area of the police and their "fourth amendment
activities."'1 49  Because the police officer's discretion is largely
invisible to the public, the police officer's discretion is largely insulated
from public scrutiny as well as "judicial oversight."'5 s  The key to
a meaningful check on police power thus rests with effective police
procedures. "A process of police rulemaking makes it possible for the
experience and expertise of the entire [police] department to be focused
upon the matter at issue and more effectively communicated to the
reviewing court."'' Therefore, when a defendant challenges a police
action in court, the judge, in assessing the relevant police procedure in
question, "could promote a dialogue with the police by affording the
law-enforcement agency an opportunity to justify and explain the
practice at issue, thereby focusing judicial review upon the legality and
proprietary of the department policies rather than the actions of an
individual officer."'5 2 Although Justice Scalia asserts that the "would
have" standard is merely a subjective test cloaked in objective clothing,
in fact it is not. The "would have" standard is objective when
undertaken in the manner Professor LaFave proposes.
Under the LaFave approach, the "would have" standard is a win-
win situation. The prosecutor can combat a defendant's bogus pretext
challenge to evidence by proving compliance with police procedures,
while the defendant remains protected by a probable cause requirement
as the framers of the Bill of Rights intended. Under the "could have"
standard, however, there is no such protection for the defendant.
There exists an opportunity for judicial review, but the review is
artificial because as Professor LaFave notes, it takes very little "to
146. See generally LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations, supra note
29.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 501.
149. Id. at 446.
150. Id. at 448.




supply grounds for a traffic stop [that are] acceptable to the
courts. "153
The Dateline NBC television expos6 dramatically revealed the
need for a pretext stop doctrine with bite, and highlighted the flaw in
Justice Scalia's reasoning. Police officers can easily obtain probable
cause to justify a traffic stop. As Dateline NBC proved in the
Louisiana expose, once the officer has probable cause, the officer,
cloaked in his probable cause shield, has free rein to search the vehicle,
make arrests, and impound the vehicle and its contents. These actions
are constitutional under the Whren holding." 4 Justice Scalia might
argue that the practice of the Louisiana officer was unconstitutional
because the officer did not have probable cause for the infraction; thus
the stop was a "fabricated" pretext stop and unconstitutional."'
Although technically this is correct, it is pragmatically wrong because
in conducting traffic stops, police officers can easily satisfy probable
cause, and the officer's discretion is largely invisible to the public."5 6
Consequently, probable cause is illusory. That probable cause is an
illusion is clear from the Dateline NBC expose, which demonstrates
Professor LaFave's concern regarding unchecked police discretion and
supports the need for the "would have" standard: probable cause is no
security at all, especially if there are no hidden cameras to protect the
citizen.
The preceding sections have outlined the basics of search and
seizure, discussed the pretext doctrine, analyzed the Whren decision,
and questioned the reasoning of Justice Scalia's opinion. However, the
citizens of Washington state can rest more easily because the Whren
decision need not apply to Washington if the Washington courts
follow the trend they have established in other areas of the state's
search and seizure law.
This next section undertakes an independent state constitutional
analysis to demonstrate that Article 1, Section 7, of the Washington
State Constitution provides broader protection to Washington citizens
than does the Fourth Amendment.
153. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 70, at 24.
154. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769.
155. See id.
156. See LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations, supra note 29.
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IV. WHY WHREN WILL NOT APPLY TO WASHINGTON STATE
Traditionally, the United States Constitution provides at least a
minimal level of protection for its citizens. But state courts, under
their own constitutions, can provide their citizens with broader
protections than the parallel provisions of the federal constitution.'57
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, courts have interpreted Article 1, Section 7, of
the Washington State Constitution as focusing not on the "subjective
privacy expectations" of citizens, but rather on "those privacy interests
which the citizens of [Washington] [s]tate have held, and should be
entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a war-
rant. 158
Because Article 1, Section 7, focuses on the objective privacy
interests of Washington citizens, the state constitution provides a
greater protection of privacy, including in the area of pretext stops,
than does the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." 9
Therefore, Washington courts should continue to apply the "would
have" standard in determining whether a stop is a pretext.
Analyzing whether Article 1, Section 7, provides Washington state
citizens greater protection from pretext stops than the Fourth
Amendment involves a three-part test.16 The first prong is an
examination of the six factors announced in State v. Gunwall to
determine whether the state constitution does provide broader
157. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). See also California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988). For an excellent history of the "rebirth of state constitutional law," see Linda
White Atkins, Recent Developments: Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution-State v.
Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 569 (1987).
158. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 577, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1990) (quoting State
v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984)).
Washington State Constitution Article 1, Section 7, states: "No person shall be disturbed
in their private affairs, or their home invaded, without authority of law." WASH. CONST. Art
1, §7. Article 1, section 7, provides two distinct areas of protection: protection in one's home,
and protection in one's private affairs. For purposes of this comment, only the latter area of
protection is considered.
159. Though not an exclusive list, Washington courts have interpreted Article 1, Section
7 to provide broader protection in the following areas: State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800
P.2d 1112 (1990) (right to privacy in one's trash); State v. Butterworth, 48 Wash. App. 152, 737
P.2d 1297, review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1004 (1987) (unlisted phone number and address); In re
Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (electric consumption records); State v. Boyce,
44 Wash. App. 724, 723 P.2d 28 (1986) (canine sniffs); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622
P.2d 1199 (1980) (automatic standing).
160. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
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protection and whether the state constitution automatically applies to
every case in which it is raised. 6'
Factor one considers the language of the state constitution to
determine whether the state constitution would mandate a different
decision than the federal constitution.'62 Factor two queries whether
significant differences exist in the texts of the parallel provisions of the
state and federal constitutions.'63  A significant difference may"warrant reliance" on the state constitution."6  Factor three evaluates
the state constitutional and common law history to determine whether
the state constitution was intended to provide broader protection than
the federal constitution. 6 ' Factor four considers the pre-existing
state law to determine whether the state law is "responsive to concerns
of its citizens .... -166 Factor five assesses the differences in struc-
ture between the federal and state constitutions.'67 This factor
focuses on the difference between enumerated powers in the federal
constitution and the guarantee of rights under the state constitu-
tion. 6" The sixth and final factor determines whether the particular
area of law is a matter best suited for national uniformity or whether
is it a matter of state interest and local concern. 69
The Gunwall analysis appears daunting at first blush, but it is
actually less complicated in the area of searches and seizures than in
other areas. Due to the prior applications of Article 1, Section 7, to
other areas of search and seizure, the Washington courts have
previously considered and adopted factors one, two, three, and
five.' 70  As such, factors one, two, three, and five are already estab-
lished and need no further analysis because in the area of search and
161. Id. at 58, 720 P.2d at 811.




166. See id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812.
167. See id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
168. See id. at 59.
169. See id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 813.
170. See State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 576, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114 (1990). When
comparing "the same constitutional provisions as those to be examined [in the instant case], we
adopt its [Gunwall's] analysis of the first, second, third, and fifth factors and examine only the
fourth and sixth factors as they apply to this particular case."
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seizure these factors remain largely constant. 7 ' Only factors four
and six require analysis since these are case specific inquiries.172
Once factors four and six are met, the second prong of the overall
three-part test requires discussion of the appropriateness of an
independent state constitutional analysis.7 3 This part of the analysis
asks why, in the area of pretext stops, the Washington state constitu-
tion provides more protection of a citizen's privacy than does the
Fourth Amendment.'74 The third prong of the analysis identifies the
appropriate standard to determine whether a stop is pretext and thus
violates Article 1, Section 7, of the Washington State Constitution. 7 '
A. Factor Four: Pre-Existing State Law
Pre-existing state law reveals that Washington state has adopted
the "would have" standard, and rejected the "could have" standard
now promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Whren.176  Accord-
ing to the Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Chapin, a stop is
not a pretext under the "would have" standard if a reasonable officer
would have made the "stop in the absence of an improper pur-
pose.""'17 To determine the actions of a "reasonable officer," the
court considers the "circumstances surrounding the stop, including
whether the officer was following standard procedures or routine
practices."' 7
171. See State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 867 P.2d 593 (1994); State v. Chrisman, 100
Wash. 2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); State
v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
172. See State v. Johnson, 75 Wash. App. 692, 702, 879 P.2d 984, 990 (1994).
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
176. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769.
177. State v. Chapin, 75 Wash. App. 460, 468, 879 P.2d 300, 305 (1994). In a more recent
Washington case, Division I of the Court of Appeals in State v. Blumenthal, 78 Wash. App. 82,
85-86, 895 P.2d 430 (1995), cited Chapin as authority in evaluating whether the defendant's
constitutional rights were violated by a pretext stop. Interestingly, the only issue before the
Blumenthal court was "whether the pretext rule should be interpreted more broadly under article
1, section 7... than under the Fourth Amendment." Without applying the proper Gunwall
analysis, the court could "not discern any reason why the ["would have" standard] should be
interpreted differently under article 1, section 7, than under the Fourth Amendment."
Essentially, the Blumenthal court did not decide the Washington state constitutional question.
They did, however, follow Chapin. The Blumenthal and Chapin decisions reveal that pre-existing
state law should "bear on the granting of distinctive state constitutional rights." Chapin, 75
Wash. App. at 468, 879 P.2d at 305 (1994) (citing U.S. v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th
Cir. 1988)).
178. Chapin, 75 Wash. App. at 468, 879 P.2d at 305.
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In Chapin, the defendant was driving a pick-up truck and pulled
out from behind an abandoned gas station. 179  A police officer saw
the defendant, followed him for a distance, and observed that his rear
license plate was in the cab window of the truck instead of being
properly mounted on the bumper."' The officer pulled Chapin over,
noticed he was not wearing his seat belt, asked Chapin for identifica-
tion, and discovered that Chapin had outstanding warrants.18' The
officer arrested Chapin.' 2  When the officer searched the truck, he
recovered a pager, open containers of alcohol, marijuana, drug para-
phernalia, and a wallet with approximately $1,100.183
Although the officer admitted that his primary purpose for
stopping Chapin was to learn what he was doing behind the abandoned
gas station, the court did not find that the stop was a pretext. 8 4 The
court primarily based its decision on the fact that the officer was
complying with standard procedures and practices.' 5 The officer
was on routine road patrol, and his duties included enforcing traffic
infractions. He testified that it was a routine practice to run warrant
checks when investigating a traffic infraction.186 The court noted
that "there was nothing to suggest that [the officer] departed from
normal procedures in making the stop."'18 7 Therefore, since he was
following standard procedures, the stop was not a pretext because a
reasonable officer would have made the stop even in the absence of an
improper purpose. 88
The Chapin court expressly dismissed the "could have" standard
because "it extinguishes the [pretext] rule."'8 9 Pre-existing Washing-
ton law indicates that an independent state constitutional analysis is
appropriate in light of Whren's application of the "could have"
standard, which is exactly the standard the Chapin court sought to
avoid. 90










189. Id. at 467, 879 P.2d at 304.
190. See id.
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B. Factor Six: Are Pretext Stops A Subject Matter of State
Interest or Local Concern?
Under this factor, the relevant inquiry is whether pretext stops are
a matter of state interest or whether this subject is one suited for
national uniformity."" If pretext stops are a matter not suited to
national uniformity, then a state constitutional analysis is appropri-
ate."9 2 To answer this inquiry, it is necessary to consider the objec-
tive of national uniformity and whether this objective is "outweighed
... by overwhelming state policy considerations to the contrary."' 19 3
While not expressly stated, the court in Chapin indicated that the
area of pretext stops is of particular state interest and local concern.
The Chapin court rejected the "could have" standard because the"could have" standard, effectively extinguishes the pretext rule-as
long as the police officer is acting within his lawful power, there is no
pretext. 94  Furthermore, under the "could have" standard, there
exists no "basis for judicial review of an officer's use of the discretion-
ary power to stop so long as the stop has a lawful basis." '  So
stating, the court implicitly established the following state policy: a
pretext rule should not pay mere lip service to the protection of
Washington State citizens.196
Therefore, the "would have" standard is the only way to deter the
police from abusing their lawful authority by ensuring that there exists
meaningful judicial review.' 97 The state policy of protecting Wash-
ington State citizens by checking police discretionary powers was of
such local concern that the Chapin court declined to follow the
majority of federal circuits in using the "could have" standard.' 9
Therefore, pretext stops are a matter of particular state interest and
local concern, and thus, the sixth Gunwall factor is satisfied. 99
191. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 59, 720 P.2d at 811.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 67, 720 P.2d at 815.
194. See Chapin, 75 Wash. App. at 467, 879 P.2d at 304.
195. Id.
196. The Chapin court stated: "Under a pure objective approach, there can logically be no
pretextual stops because, where the officer is acting lawfully, his or her actions are defined as
objectively reasonable. We reject this approach because it extinguishes the rule. Second, under
a pure objective approach, there is no basis for judicial review of an officer's use of the
discretionary power to stop so long as the stop has a lawful basis." Id.
197. See id. at 467-69, 879 P.2d at 304-305.
198. See id.
199. See generally State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 446, 909 P.2d 293, 302 (1996).
(holding that Factor six is met in Article 1, Section 7, cases: "Petitioner correctly recognizes that
privacy interests are matters of particular state interest and local concern.").
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Gunwall factors four and six indicate that an independent state
constitutional analysis is appropriate. The next section undertakes the
second prong of the independent state constitutional analysis: the
privacy consideration.
C. The Privacy Consideration
Article 1, Section 7, protects persons from being "disturbed in
their private affairs," or their homes invaded, "without authority of
law." ' Under Article 1, Section 7, the court determines a violation
of a person's privacy expectations according to whether the state
unreasonably intruded into the defendant's private affairs.2 ' What
constitutes a "private affair" is defined by "those privacy interests that
the citizens of Washington state have held, and should be entitled to
hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant. '"202
In order to determine whether the citizens of Washington state
have a legitimate privacy interest in being free from pretext stops
requires discussion of the textual language of Article 1, Section 7, and
a comparison of the text to the ramifications of the doctrine of pretext
stops.
It could be argued from a policy perspective that extinguishing a
meaningful pretext stop doctrine serves a valuable purpose: it allows
good police officers, who are concerned with the well being of the
populace as a whole, to get villains and drugs off of our streets. So
viewed, the pretext stop doctrine serves only the guilty by allowing the
evidence against them to be inadmissible. °3  The pretext stop
doctrine does not protect the privacy of a grandmother driving an olive
Dodge Dart, going 45 m.p.h. It does not protect the midlevel
manager, driving his Jeep Cherokee, equipped with ski racks, and a
"My Kid Is An Honor Student At Washington Elementary" bumper
sticker. Or does it?
In 1987, Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in Arizona
v. Hicks.2" In Hicks, a police officer entered an apartment from
which a bullet had been fired.20 5 Inside the apartment, the police
officer noticed expensive stereo equipment that looked out of place."06
The officer discovered that some of the equipment was stolen when he
200. See WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
201. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
202. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d at 446, 909 P.2d at 302.
203. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
204. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
205. See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
206. See id.
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called his dispatch with the equipment's serial numbers. °7 The
officer eventually seized the equipment.0
In his opinion, Justice Scalia found that the officer did not have
probable cause to search the premises or seize the equipment .2 09
Therefore, the search and seizure violated the Fourth Amendment.210
In dismissing the dissent's arguments, Justice Scalia supported his view
by stating, "there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitu-
tion sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of us all. ' 211 Admittedly, the "insulation" Justice Scalia was
referring to was probable cause, which the officer did not have. 2
Because the officer did not have probable cause, his actions were
unconstitutional, and the protections of the Fourth Amendment were
triggered.
But consider Justice Scalia's Hicks opinion in light of the Chapin
court's fears regarding the "could have" standard. In the words of
Judge Agid, "The entire purpose of the pretext rule is to deter police
from using their lawful authority to detain a person for a minor offense
in order to investigate or search for evidence of a more serious
offense. 21 3  Assuming that Judge Agid is correct about the true
purpose of the pretext rule, Justice Scalia's statement about the
Constitution insulating the criminality of a few, establishes the privacy
element needed for the independent state constitutional analysis. The
U.S. Constitution intervenes only in order to protect the citizens from
unlawful abuses of police authority (an officer fabricating a traffic stop
without probable cause), while Washington courts have found a
privacy interest for Washington citizens in being free from abuses of
lawful police authority.
The preceding section has established factors four and six of the
Gunwall analysis as well as a valid privacy interest. The third part of
the independent state constitutional analysis demonstrates that the"would have" standard is appropriate under Article 1, Section 7, of the
Washington State Constitution.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 323-24.
209. See id. at 325.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 329.
212. See id.
213. State v. Chapin, 75 Wash. App. 460, 467, 879 P.2d 300, 304 (1994).
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D. Leaving Well Enough Alone: The "Would Have"
Standard Works
The appropriate standard for courts to apply to determine whether
a stop is a pretext is the "would have" standard because it provides for
a pretext doctrine that actually combats both unlawful abuses of police
authority as well as abuses of lawful police authority.214 The "would
have" standard allows for protections on both sides: it allows for more
than the illusory reliance on probable cause to protect Washington
citizens from unfettered police discretion by providing for meaningful
judicial review of police officer's actions.1 Also, the "would have"
standard gives prosecutors ammunition to combat a defendant's pretext
challenge to evidence obtained via probable cause if the police officer
was following standard police procedure. 216
Thus, the "would have" standard is appropriate under Article 1,
Section 7, of the Washington State Constitution; coupled with the six
nonexclusive Gunwall factors, the independent state constitutional
analysis is satisfied. The next section applies the "would have"
standard to the Whren facts to predict the possible future treatment of
pretext stops in Washington.
E. Was Whren A Pretext Stop Under Article 1, Section 7?
Under Article 1, Section 7, of the Washington State Constitution
and the "would have" standard, the Whren case would have had a
different outcome. Recall that the Chapin court is not concerned with
the police officer's subjective motivation." 7 It determined whether
a stop was a pretext by looking at the circumstances surrounding the
stop, including "whether the officer was following standard procedures
or routine practices in effecting [the] stop. 218
In the Whren case, the vice officers were patrolling a "high drug
area" in an unmarked car. 19 The officers determined that they
wanted to stop the defendants for traffic violations.220 The Washing-
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations, supra note 29.
217. See Chapin, 75 Wash. App. at 466, 879 P.2d at 304.
218. Id. at 468, 879 P.2d at 305.
219. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
220. The court found the officers had probable cause to stop the defendants for the
following traffic offenses: 18 D.C. Municipal Regulation § 2213.4 (1995) ("An operator shall...
give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle"); § 2204.3 ("No person shall turn any
vehicle... without giving an appropriate signal"); § 2200.3 ("No person shall drive a vehicle...
at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions."); Whren, 116 S. Ct. at
1997]
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ton, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department regulations generally
prohibit plainclothes police officers or officers in unmarked vehicles
from giving traffic tickets.221 The regulations also prohibit the
officers from giving oral warnings, by allowing oral warnings only
under "extreme circumstances. ' 222  Accordingly, Officer Soto testi-
fied that the only time he would issue a ticket was for reckless driving,
and that he stopped people for traffic violations "[n]ot very often at
all. "223
The surrounding circumstances reveal that the vice officers were
seriously deviating from department procedures. Also, it was highly
unlikely that a reasonable plainclothes vice officer would have pulled
the defendants over absent an improper motive. This case is distin-
guishable from Chapin, where the officers were performing their
regular duties, and following regular police procedure.224 Therefore,
under Article 1, Section 7, the stop in Whren would be a pretext stop,
where the officers used their lawful authority in hopes of finding a
more serious offense.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington courts, in many areas of search and seizure, have
found broader protection for Washington state citizens under the
Washington Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment. The
U.S. Supreme Court's Whren decision, while technically complying
with the text of the Fourth Amendment's requirement for probable
cause, ignores the protections that probable cause was intended to
provide. Because Whren effectively overrules the doctrine of pretext
stops and requires the toothless "could have" standard, Washington
courts should continue to provide Washington citizens with the
protection of the "would have" standard.
1772.
221. Metropolitan Police Department Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1 pt. 1,
Objectives and Policies (A)(2)(4) (April 30, 1992) states: Members who are not in uniform or are
in unmarked vehicles may take [traffic] enforcement action only in the case of a violation that is
so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.
222. Metropolitan Police Department Washington, D.C., General Order 303.1 pt. 1,
objectives and policies, (A)(Z)(Sa) (April 30, 1992), which states: in each instance of a stop for
a traffic violation, the member shall:
(1) Issue either a Notice of Infraction (NOI); or
(2) Issue a Warning Notice of Infraction; or
(3) Under extreme circumstances an oral warning may be given (e.g., receipt of a radio
assignment requiring immediate response, or the motorist was enroute to a hospital for
emergency treatment of a sick or injured passenger).
223. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 102, at 7.
224. See Chapin, 75 Wash. App. at 468, 879 P.2d at 305.
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